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Abstract 
Traditional payment methods such as credit cards are not suitable for small amount payment because 
the transaction may cost certain commission comparable to the small amount payment. When we buy a 
cheap item at real shop, we pay by cash. But, how about online shopping where you cannot pay by cash? 
There are a ton of contents online having potential value to sell but not as expensive as credit card 
payment fits - such as multimedia clips. How an online shopper can buy them? A widely used solution is 
aggregation: online merchants bundle several (sometimes unnecessary) items together to multiply the 
price. Another solution is having payment method suitable for small amount, aka micropayment. There 
has been many research-level micropayment schemes developed, using cryptographic schemes to 
eliminate the need to access central server for authorization purposes - what researchers claim costly 
operation. Such schemes with "off-line" verification enable banks or other participants to trace back to a 
crook that cheats by double spending. However, such schemes cannot stop double spending itself and 
thus a crook can run away before they become aware of the cheat[?]. 
Comments 
University of Pennsylvania Department of Computer and Information Science Technical Report No. MS-
CIS-02-28. 
This technical report is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_reports/154 
On-line payment method for small amount transactions 
using hierarchical prepaid cards 
(Extended Abstract) 
T6ru Egashira, and Jonathan M. Smith 
egashira@bq.jp.nec.com, jms@central.cis.upenn.edu 
Abstract 
Abstract follows.. . 
Keywords 
Keyword One, Keyword Two. 
1. Introduction 
Traditional payment methods such as credit cards are not suitable for small amount 
payment because the transaction may cost certain commission comparable to the small 
amount payment. When we buy a cheap item at real shop, we pay by cash. But, how about 
online shopping where you cannot pay by cash? There are a ton of contents online having 
potential value to sell but not as expensive as credit card payment fits - such as multimedia 
clips. How an online shopper can buy them? A widely used solution is aggregation: online 
merchants bundle several (sometimes unnecessary) items together to multiply the price. 
Another solution is having payment method suitable for small amount, aka micropayment. 
There has been many research-level micropayment schemes developed, using cryptographic 
schemes to eliminate the need to access central server for authorization purposes - what 
researchers claim costly operation. Such schemes with "off-line" verification enable banks or 
other participants to trace back to a crook that cheats by double spending. However, such 
schemes cannot stop double spending itself and thus a crook can run away before they 
become aware of the cheat [?I. 
This paper proposes a payment scheme with low-cost on-line authorization. The scheme 
bases on a prepaid-card system: a customer first buy a (virtual) card from a card issuer, then 
she pay merchants for items or services using the card up to the amount of its face value. With 
hierarchically structured prepaid cards and wallet software installed on every customer 
terminal, we relieve reliability requirements for servers and thus lower server operation costs 
that affect authorization cost for each transaction. 
2. Cost of transactions 
We first define a simplified model of a payment-card-based transaction system. There are 
three roles: customer, issuer, and merchant in the model (Figure 1). In the model, there are 
many customers and merchants, but we assume there is only a single issuer in the world for 
simplicity. A customer provides the information of hislher card, which the issuer issued, to 
pay a merchant for merchandise. The merchant then forwards the card data to the issuer and 
asks for the transaction to be authorized. If successfully authorized, the merchant provides 
merchandise as the customer requests. The issuer issues payment cards to customers and 
receive funds from them. As we think of prepaid-card-based scheme, the issuer receives 
money as a result of selling prepaid cards to customers. The issuer maintains a database that 
has records of accounts each corresponds to an issued card, and makes decisions whether 
transactions should be approved based on data in these records. An authorized transaction 
results in the issuer's fund transfer to the merchant. The issuer might not pay the amount of 
transaction fully: it deducts some amount as a commission aka "merchandise discount." The 
issuer 
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Figure 1. A simple model of a transaction system. 
commission is the issuer's main source of revenue unless there are other big sources such as 
annual membership fee and installment interest as is the case of credit cards. But, from the 
viewpoint of merchants, it is the transaction cost they must pay. \ 
The transaction cost involves many factors. Some of them are technical matters like this 
study deals with, and others are not. Some kind of business incurs more overhead costs than 
others: bank is an example. Banks are under bank law enforcement that needs wide disclosure 
of their operations and other regulations to meet. Though such regulations let them reliable, 
they force certain amount of overhead cost on banks. If you are going to start up a business 
that manages individual accounts for general public to add and withdraw their funds, you 
must be a bank and those regulations are yours. But if you just deal with prepaid cards, which 
are not bound to an individual and people cannot add funds, you don't have to be a bank (at 
least in Japan), and you can be competitive in terms of operation costs. This is the first reason 
we propose a prepaid-card-based scheme (other reasons are technical, which will be discussed 
later on). 
We deal with the cost of authorization system operation. The system must work reliably 
2417, or merchants may lose business chances, which is also critical for issuer business. The 
higher the reliability requirement, the higher the system operation costs generally - we have 
to overcome this formula to establish a small-amount payment system. 
3. Reducing the cost 
We now introduce two techniques to reduce the reliability requirement. The first technique 
is account caching by customers instead of by servers. The second technique is the use of 
hierarchical cards to increase customers' chances to have spare cards. These techniques are 
not mutually exclusive but rather complementary and we can use both in a system. 
3.1. Customer caching 
We assume that issuer's authorization system consists of more than one server clusters 
each has its own account database. Our clusters each manages a mutually exclusive part of 
total accounts space, and it might consist only a single host. The slicing of accounts will 
naturally distribute authorization-processing load among these clusters. 
Now we are going to allow one of these clusters to go down while (almost) all 
transactions are correctly processed. We put "almost" because in certain condition we may 
allow fraud transactions (but the risk will be small as shown later). To allow a cluster to be 
down, we must have a spare account record for every account on somewhere other than the 
cluster that has the original. These spare records are normally managed on another cluster. We, 
however, let customers have these spare and don't let clusters permanently have spare records. 
This will reduce the number of accesses to clusters and account databases: when we update a 
"master" account record (e.g. due to the deduction from the balance), the change has to be 
propagated to the spare record within some short period of time, and that involves accesses to 
another cluster and its DB if we store spares into a neighbor cluster, but we don't. 
When one of the clusters failed and a customer is going to make a payment to a merchant 
using a card of which the failed cluster has the master record, what happens? The merchant 
now realizes the cluster it is asking for authorization is down, and then asks the secondary 
cluster for help. The secondary cluster checks if the cluster is really failed; creates a spare 
record for the card, taking the balance data as the customer provides; and authorizes later 
payments that uses the corresponding card based on the record until the failed cluster recovers. 
When the failed cluster recovers, it updates the master record according to the spare record. 
The secondary cluster does not have to be a dedicated one but another cluster primarily for its 
own slice of accounts space. But, some attention is needed for such "mutual help" system - 
if we assign a cluster B to be a secondary cluster for all records in a cluster A, chain reaction 
may happen: when A go down because of heavy processing load, all the load will next knock 
out B. Thus, spare records for a cluster should be distributed among all other clusters, in a 
manner that the spare record for card A1 is on cluster B, A 2  is on cluster C, and so on, for the 
additional processing load on surviving clusters to be distributed. Of course, all merchants 
must know the identical mapping rule that specifies which cluster has spares for which cards. 
As described above, we depend on customers to have copies of card records. But how can 
they do that? We assume every customer has wallet software that helps customer's processing 
of transactions and it will cache account records also. A customer makes every online 
payment through the wallet software, so it knows how much the customer has spent and 
amount left. Suppose a debit card system that the customer cache is applied the same way, 
things don't work well: as the account is a checking account of a bank, we can modify the 
account record by issuing checks, ATM withdrawal, wire transfer, and so on; thus the 
customer cache linked to only debit card usage become stale easily. Prepaid card system, 
however, we neither can add funds nor withdraw through back doors, and thus customer cache 
sounds. This is the second reason we propose a prepaid-card-based scheme. 
We must be aware of a possible fraud using a false wallet: a wallet that reports its card has 
full balance regardless of the actual balance. When the user of the wallet make a payment 
while the cluster for the card is down, a spare record will be created as the wallet reports - 
full balance, as nobody can check the report at that time. Until the failed cluster revives, the 
user can enjoy shopping as much as the full balance of the card. At later time when the cluster 
revives, it will know there was a fraud, and the issuer may cancel all transactions falsely made. 
Though it can stop merchant to stop shipping items, we cannot take back already transmitted 
multimedia contents. 
There is a measure for the fraud, but far from perfection. We should make wallets to 
always report the current balance of a card it is going to use, and the cluster should check if it 
is correct. When the balance does not match, the cluster rejects the transaction, and possibly 
suspends further payment from the card. That will reject frauds using false wallets that 
ALWAYS report incorrect balance - we cannot stop fraud if the user can know which cluster 
is down and which card is enabled for the fraud. 
Though we cannot stop the fraud completely, we can make the risk and incentive of fraud 
to be small enough using the next technique: hierarchical cards. More explanation will come 
later. 
3.2. Hierarchical cards 
Imagine you are thirsty and buying a bottle of drink at a vending machine; you put coins 
in the slot, but one of them are rejected. What do you do? You just put another coin if you 
have. In the same manner, we ask a customer for another prepaid card when a card cannot be 
processed due to cluster failure. Of course, the customer might have only the card that failed 
and we are not going to force customers to have two or more cards. There is a way to increase 
the possibility for a customer to possess two or more cards: selling cards as a bunch, not 
individually. So is a hierarchical card, which is sold to and handled by a person as an 
indivisible unit, but it has actual cards inside. We call a card that people recognize as a "major 
card," and actual cards inside a major card as "minor cards." 
To bridge the gap between what people recognize and what the system processes, we 
again assume customers use wallet software to make payment. A user first registers her major 
cards to the wallet; then it handles them as bunches of minor cards; it makes payment using 
one or more of these minor cards; and when a merchant asks you for another card, it provides 
another minor card if it has. 
Though the probability for a customer to possess another minor card will increase with 
this technique, it is less than one. If there are no another cards, the transaction will not be 
authorized. What probability a transaction fails? There is another concern: how much cluster 
accesses increase? As we put a bunch of major cards into a major card, the value of a minor 
card must of course be smaller than the major. So, a customer has to use two or more minor 
cards to make a payment - that involves two or more clusters to be accessed. Next section 
provides analysis of these concerns. 
4. Analysis of hierarchical cards 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented the architecture of a node inquiry function (NIF) that 
helps on-line service providers to place front-ends strategically. The strategic placement plan 
that the NIF provides enables a service provider to easily obtain the best possible front-end 
distribution that maximizes investment efficiency. The node filter hnction in the NIF helps 
service providers to find fiont-end nodes that can run their front-ends: it accepts predicates 
and finds those heterogeneous front-end nodes that satisfy each predicate. The placement 
planner function in the NIF makes placement plans, which enhances the service quality 
regardless of how many front-ends are finally deployed. The algorithm combines brute-force 
and greedy approaches to calculate placement plans in polynomial time. 
For future directions of the NIF, it will need more input from on-line service providers to 
make more efficient placement plans. A NIF-suggested placement plan, once generated, will 
soon become obsolete due to changes in demand and so on. A service provider thus may need 
to have a new plan suggested midway through the old plan. The current NIF, however, 
assumes that no front-ends have already been deployed. A future NIF should accept the 
provider's input of current deployment and take it into consideration. 
The cost and demand matrices in the cost map are currently applied for every on-line 
service. To calculate more efficient placement plans, this information should reflect service- 
specific metrics and usage data, which only the service provider knows. A future NIF should 
provide cost maps for each on-line service and customize them according to the provider's 
feedback. 
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